I. INTRODUCTION T HE CIPHER communication system shown in
has been studied by various authors. Suppose that the source is finite discrete memoryless and its entropy is H(X). Then, it is well-known that perfect security can be achieved if and only if the key rate is equal to the source entropy H(X) [l] , [2] . The term "perfect" means that no information about X can be obtained from the codeword W,, without the key W,, even if an infinite amount of time is used for the cryptanalysis, that is, (l/N)H(XIW,) = H(X) where N is the block length of X.
In the cipher system, it is generally assumed that the key W, is transferred to the destination through a special channel that can be perfectly protected against wiretappers. However, such special channels cannot be realized, especially if a high key rate is required. Hence we assume here that the two channels of Fig. 1 cannot be protected from wiretappers. Then the system becomes the secret sharing communication system (SSCS) with two channels, as shown in Fig. 2 , where the two channels are on an equality and the source output X is mapped to two codewords WI and W,. The decoder reproduces X from both WI and W,. The security level of this system may be measured with ((l/N)H( X] W,), (l/N) H(X] W,)). For this SSCS, we can devise several encoding methods. For instance, W, and W, are used as the codeword W, and the key W,, respectively, vice versa, or WI and W, are used as the time-sharing of W, and W,, etc. Then, how is secret and efficient coding possible for this SSCS? In this paper, we shall obtain the rate region g*(hi, h2) necessary to attain the given security level (hi, h2) = ((l/N)H(XIW,), (1/WWJw2)). Manuscript received October 2, 1984; revised August 22, 1985 . This work was presented in part at the VI Symposium on Information Theory and its Application, Matuyama, Japan, November 1983.
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IEEE Log Number 8407219. As an extension of Fig. 2 , let us consider next the SSCS with three channels depicted in Fig. 3 , where the source output X is mapped to three codewords W,, W,, and W,. Let us assume that the information X should be reproduced from (WI, W,, W,), but no information should be obtained from just one codeword y(i = 1,2,3). For this SSCS, the security level may be measured with
. In this paper, we shall also obtain the rate region g3( h,, h,, h3) necessary to attain the given security level (h,, h,, h3) = ((l/N)H(XIW,W,), (l/N)H(XIW,W,), (l/N)H(XlW,W,)) for the SSCS with three channels. It is worth noticing that the SSCS with three channels reduces to the three-out-of-three or two-out-of-three secret sharing system (SSS) [3] 
or (h,, h,, h3) = (0, 0, 0), respectively. Hence the SSCS can be considered as an extension of the SSS. To realize the two-out-of-three or three-out-of-three codes, the rate of each codeword must be equal to H(X). However, it will be shown that, if we use the SSCS code having (h,, h,, h3) = ((1/2)H(X), (1/2)H(X), (1/2)H(X)), which corresponds to an intermediate code between the two-out-of-three and three-out-of-three codes, the necessary rate for each codeword is half, that is, (1/2M X).
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In Section II, the formal statement of the problem and results for the SSCS with two channels are given. The SSCS with three channels is treated in Section III. All the theorems are proved in the Appendices.
II. SSCS WITH Two CHANNELS
Let { X,}T=, be a sequence of independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables X taking values in a finite set X. For the SSCS with two channels shown in Fig 
The information X must be transferred to the destination without errors and must be protected from wiretappers. These conditions may be represented by
Pr{X#$} I c,
where 0 I h,, h, I H(X) and (h,, h2) stands for a securWe also notice that, for a given (R,, R2), we cannot ity level. (See Appendix III). If, for all c > 0, there exists achieve a security level such that h, > R, or h, > R,. The for N sufficiently large a code (f2, &) satisfying both (4) security level of each channel is dominated by the other and (5), (R,, R,, h,, h2 ) is said to be achievable. Then channel rate. Furthermore, to achieve the most secure (h,, h,)-achievable rate region g2(hl, h2) is defined by system, that is, (h,, h 2) = (H(X), H(X)), both R, and R 2 .9P2(hl, h2) A {(R,, R,): (R,, R,, h,, h2) isachievable}. must be equal to the source entropy H(X).
(6) III.
SSCS WITH THREE CHANNELS
For this BZ( h,, h2), the following theorem holds. Let us consider the SSCS with three channels depicted in -@z(hI, hz) = .@;@I, hz),
where $3: I,, x I,+ x I&f3 + 2-N,
The code ( f3, Go) is required to satisfy the following secur-
ity condition (see Appendix III):
9Q(hl, h2) is depicted by Fig. 4 (a) and (b), which correspond to the cases of h, + h 2 2 H( X) and 0 I h, + h, < H(X), respectively. We notice from (8) that if h, + h 2 2 H(X), the larger h, and h, become, the more rates are required. On the other hand, if h, + h 2 < H(X), the smaller h, and h, become, the more rates are required. This fact may be explained as follows. In the former case, the more rate is used to randomize the information about X included in the codeword N$ (i = 1,2). On the contrary, in the latter case the more rate is required to reproduce X from the codeword y within the equivocation level hi.
&l(Xlyl4$ -h, 5 c,
From (ll), X can be reproduced from the three codewords (WI, W,, W,) within an arbitrarily small error probability. However, from (12), wiretappers can obtain no information about X from only the one codeword Wj. Furthermore, if wiretappers obtain the two codewords (K, Wj), then they can obtain the information about X with the equivocation h k' For the SSCS with three channels, (R,, R,, R,, h,, h,, h3) is said to be achievable if a code exists satisfying (ll)-(13).
The (h,, h,, h,)-achievable rate region B3(h,, h,, h3) is defined by
is achievable}.
/:
For this .9t3(hl, h,, h3), the following theorem holds.
Theorem 2: (a) where g~T (h,, h,, 4) A { (4, R,, R,):
Proof: See Appendix II.
Without loss of generality, let us suppose that 0 I h, I h, I h, 5 H(X). Then %'c(hl, h,, h3) is given by Fig. 5 (a), (b), or (c), which correspond to the following cases, respectively:
If (h,, h,, h3) = (H(X), WX), H(X)) or (4, h,, h3) = (O,O,O), then the SSCS with three channels reduces to the three-out-of-three or two-out-of-three SSS, respectively [3], [4] . From Theorem 2, we notice that, to realize the three-out-of-three or two-out-of-three SSS, each rate Rj must be equal to the source entropy H(X). If (h,, h,, h3) = (H( X)/2, H( X)/2, H(X)/2) is used, the necessary rate is only half of H(X).
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Coding theorems have been proved for the SSCS with two or three channels, which are extensions of the corresponding SSS. We can also consider the coding problem for the SSCS with four or more channels. However, the proof for such case is fairly cumbersome, since many parameters must be treated to describe the security level. for N sufficiently large. On the other hand, we have from (5) that
For example, the following parameters may be considered for the SSCS with four channels:
;H(X,W;W,W,) -hijk's .E.
Equations (21) and (23) ( 26) can be achieved by the codes for the SSCS at more efficient Proof: Let T[ X] be the set of typical sequences of X. Then rates than those of SSS schemes.
it is well-known that, for any c > 0 and N sufficiently large,
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For simplicity, we use the following notations, and we consider APPENDIX I these numbers as integers: 
Affix the suffixes 0,1,2;.., S;..,'L -1 to each x E T[X] according to some random order. Then define T(t), t = 0,1,2;..,z, -l,by
In the case h, + h, 2 H(X), it is sufficient to show that a code exists such that
R, > h,. 
Then the decoder output X can be obtained by Proof: Let (R,, R,, R,) E .%',(h,, h,, hs). Then a code 2 = Xi[,, + i. (42) cf37 $3) exists that satisfies (ll)-(13). Hence, for any e > 0, Clearly, the foregoing code satisfies (35) and (36) since 0 I IV, I L2 -1, 0 5 W, I L, -1. It also satisfies (4) because the typical R, ";logM, z;H(q) sequences can be reproduced at the decoder without error. Furthermore, (5) can be proved as follows. The code maps all +f(w;,ct;w,)
x E T(t) to the same codeword IV,. Since all the typical sequences appear equiprobably, the code satisfies
On the other hand, if the random number y is fixed, one x in 2h;-E
each T(l), t = 0,1,2;.., zr, is mapped to the same codeword Wz. When y varies within the range 0 5 y I L,, -1, different where the last inequality follows from (ll), (13) h, + h, h, + h,
the equivocation (h,, h2) can be achieved at the rate of point C, that is, (H(X) -h,, H(X) -h2). Although the foregoing timesharing code achieves (hi, h2) on the average, the information cannot be kept secret using code A. This defect, however, can be overcome by the following preprocessing. Let x,,, x,~; . ., x,,; . ., xJI. be the source outputs to be transferred, each of which has length N, j, stands for the suffix of typical sequences, 0 <jr I L -1. Let y(j) be the binary representation of j. Then each y(j) has length N[ H( X) + c]. Permute the binary sequence of y(j,)y(j,)
. . . y(j,) as in Fig. 6 , redivide it into L sequences, say z(l), z (2), . ., z(L), and then use the time-sharing code for these sequences z(i). 
where the last inequality follows from (12). From (47) and (48), we have
Lemma 4 (Direct Part of Theorem 2):
g3(h,,h,,h,) zS;(hl,h2,h3).
Proof: Suppose that 0 I h, I h z I h, I H(X). Then the rate region .%'T(h,, h,, h,) is given by (17b), (18b), or (19b) .
In the case of (17a), it is sufficient to show that a code exists that satisfies (ll)- (13) at the following rates:
For simplicity, we use the following notations again:
Furthermore, the numbers just defined and L,/L,, L/L, can be approximated by integers with any accuracy for sufficiently large N.
Let yi, y2, ys be uniform random integers taking values in the following ranges:
(46) o<y+z3-1.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY, VOL. ~32, NO. 3, MAY 1986 Now let the source output be x,,.,+~ E T[X](O I t I z, -1, 0 I S I L, -1). We define the code by
The source output can be decoded from (W,, W,, W,) as follows:
J?=(W3-~3L23-jCI-?l)modL,.
Clearly, this code satisfies (51) since 0 I W I L,, i = 1,2,3. Equation (11) is also satisfied by (27). Since W, contains no information about (t, S), we have
W, contains the information about t. However, y2z3 + y3 in (59) varies uniformly and randomly over the same range as t, 0 5 t I L, -1. Hence
Although W, contains the information about S, we have also
because, from L,, I L,, I L,, (y3 L,, + y1 + y*) mod L, in (60) varies uniformly and randomly over the same range as S, 0 I S 1. L, -1.
If wiretappers obtain (W,, W,), they can reproduce t from (61)-(63). However, they can obtain no information about S. Hence $H(X,WIWz) -h, < c.
Next suppose that (W,, W,) is wiretapped. Then, since (y,, ys) can be uniquely determined from W,, the wiretappers can obtain the information
From (56) 
Finally, suppose that ( W,, W,) lgets out. If we assume a certain t for this W, , we can uniquely defermine ( y2, ys). Then, from W3 ,
we can obtain the information 
In the case of (18a), we first show that a code exists, say C,, that satisfies ( hiA', h';", hiA)) = (H( X),0,0)
at the rate of point A in Fig. 5 , that is, R, = R, = R, = H(X). 
;H(X,w,w,)
On the other hand, from the proof of the case of (17a), a code exists, say C,, such that
where the rates correspond to the point B in Fig. 5 . By time-sharing codes C, and C, at the ratio
we can obtain a code that achieves (h,, h,, h3) at the rate (4, R,, 4) = (h,>ff(X) -h,, H(X) -hd.
In the case of (19a), we first show that a code exists, say CD, that satisfies both (R,, R,, R3) = (H(X), H(X), H(X)) and (hi"', h',"', hiD') = (O,O,O) . Let x, E T[ X] and y(j) be the source output and the binary representation of j, respectively. By dividing y(j) into three parts of equal length, we have y(j) = ( y,, y,, y3) where each y, , k = 1,2,3, has length N{ H( X) + e}/3. Furthermore, let r, and r, be binary random integers that have length N{ H( X) + c }/3. Then the code CD is defined by
cI/T7=(~~@fi,y~@r,,r,)
%= (Y, @rl,rl @r2,.v2@9) 
where @ stands for the bitwise modulo two summation. Clearly, code C,, satisfies ;H(X,v) 2 H(X) -c, ;H(X,ey) I c.
By time-sharing code CD and code C, at the ratio (88) (89) h, -h,
h, -h,
we have code C,; that satisfies and .@(h,, h,, h,) , are given by
where the rates correspond to point E in Fig. 5 . On the other
hand, from the proof of the case of (17a), a code exists, say C,, Furthermore, it can be easily shown that %(h,,h,), ifh,+h,>H(X)
. 
that satisfies (R,tR,,R,) = (7 > hif-1 h\F', h',F' where the rates correspond to the point F in Fig. 5 .
Finally, by time-sharing codes C, and C, at the ratio h, + h,
'-H(X) .
h2 + h,
we obtain a code that achieves (h,, h,, h3) at the rate triple (R,>R,,R,) =(H(X) -h,,H(X) -h,,ff(X) -4).
The above code attains (h, , h,, h,) only on the average, but this defect can be overcome as in Appendix I.
APPENDIX III
Someone may think that the conditions ;H(X,&) 2 h, -c
and ;H(X,b:;y) 2 h, -c
are appropriate rather than (5) and (13), respectively, because only the lower bounds of the equivocations should be given in order to specify the security level. If (96) and (97) are used instead of (5) and (13), the achievable rate regions, say 2: ( h,, h,) where [ .I" denotes the convex hull.
.G%'t ( h, , h z ) may be desirable rather than L%'2 (h 1, h 2). However, S3(h,, h,, h,)isusefulratherthan .%'~(h,, h,, h,). Forinstance, when we wish to design an SSCS with three channels such that 
